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The Dilemma of Balancing the Administration of Justice 
and the Preservation of Confidentiality in the Mediation 
Process 
Mrinal Vijay* 
INTRODUCTION 
The courts and the American Arbitration Association (AAA) refer to mediation 
as a procedure in which communications between the disputants is facilitated by 
a neutral third party (mediator) to reach a mutually acceptable settlement to the 
dispute in question.1 Mediation is gaining momentum as an alternative method 
to litigation in resolving commercial disputes.2 Stamato submits that it has 
become the most accelerated form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR),3 
since litigants are currently concerned with settling disputes without a trial; court 
claims belong to the last resort.4 Private negotiation and settlement of 
potentially litigated disputes are unequivocally favoured by public policy.5 Thus, 
ADR methods like arbitration and mediation are becoming popular and are 
* Ph.D. Candidate at Durham University and Business Law Manager with the Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.
1 American Arbitration Association, 'A Guide to Mediation and Arbitration for Business
People' (2000)
<http://www.adr.org> accessed 3 April 2015; see also, E Stong, 'The Uniform
Mediation Act: An Opportunity to Enhance Confidentiality in Business Mediation'
(2002) ADR Currents 5.
2 BE Meyerson, 'Mediation And Arbitration Converge In New California Supreme Court
Decision' (2007) Arizona ADR Forum 6.
3 L Stamato, 'Dispute Resolution and the Glass Ceiling: Ending Sexual Discrimination at
the Top' (2000) 55 (1) Dispute Resolution Journal 24.
4 AKC Koo, 'Confidentiality of Mediation Communications' (2011) 30 (2) Civil Justice
Quarterly 193.
5 MA Weston, 'Confidentiality’s Constitutionality: The Incursion On Judicial Powers To
Regulate Party Conduct In Court-Connected Mediation' (2003) 8 (29) Harvard
Negotiation Law Review 44.
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being incorporated into the conventional judicial litigation process.6 
Regardless of the increasing acceptability of private settlement, it is 
essentially vital that the disputants who have submitted their arguments in court 
abide by the judicial procedural standards.7 Cornes submits that mediation is not 
simply ‘assisted without prejudice negotiations’; privilege and confidentiality are 
the key elements of a successful mediation, and the principal reasons for opting 
for mediation.8 This is especially true in commercial mediation because the 
disputants expect their personal and commercial confidences to remain strictly 
confidential. Peterson suggests that without mediation’s confidential guarantee, 
no sensible disputants or mediators would make admissions or provide evidence 
that could be adversarial for them in future litigation (should mediation fail)9 
and numerous advantages for mediation, which are measured in cost, time, 
relationship, reputation etc., would prove futile.10 Mediation is encouraged as a 
privileged and private process, and confidentiality has been illustrated as a 
central feature of that process, in comparison with open and accessible tribunal 
or court proceedings (operating on the public record).11  
However, given the globally varied approach towards the issue of 
confidentiality, arguably mediation confidentiality does not grant complete 
immunity from disclosure in legal proceedings.12 In fact, as Koo argues, the 
‘legal protection for confidentiality in mediation is far from absolute’.13 This 
essay examines the extent to which the law requires the maintenance of 
confidential relationships in private interests. Particularly, the author explores 
the balance between preserving confidences and the administration of justice in 
the public interest, which demands disclosure of all significant information 
6 KVW Stone, Private Justice: The Law of Alternative Dispute Resolution (1st edn Foundation 
Press 2000) 799. 
7 SR Cole, 'Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in 
Dispute Resolution' (2000) 51 Law Journal 1199, 1202. 
8 D Cornes, 'Mediation Privilege and the EU Mediation Directive: An Opportunity?' 
(2008) 74 Arbitration 395. 
9 M Zamboni, 'Confidentiality in Mediation' (2003) 6(5) International Arbitration Law 
Review 176. 
10 ALH Peterson, 'When Mediation Confidentiality and Substantive Law Clash: An 
Inquiry into the Impact of In Re Marriage of Kieturakis on California's Confidentiality Law' 
(2007) 8(1) Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 199. 
11 D Spencer, Essential Dispute Resolution (2nd edn Cavendish, Australia 2005) 65. 
12 Paragon Finance Plc (formerly National Home Loans Corp Plc) v Freshfields [1999] 1 WLR 1183 
CA at 1188. 
13 Koo (n 4) 192-203. 
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required for the unprejudiced disposal of litigation.14 In doing so, the essay will 
begin by examining the mediation agreement, then move on to considering the 
varied approaches towards mediation adopted primarily in the United Kingdom 
(UK), United States (US), and finally end by exploring a balanced approach 
between the competing policies of confidentiality and the demands of justice. 
I. THE MEDIATION AGREEMENT
An ideal mediation agreement encompasses a non-disclosure duty of all the 
information produced or transpired in connection with the mediation between 
the disputants and the mediator.15 The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators 
provides that the agreement may also require that in any following litigation, 
arbitration, or adjudication arising out of the dispute, the disputants will abstain 
from calling the mediator as a witness,16 unless the law requires the evidence or 
there is a serious risk to the life or safety of any person.17 With respect to 
confidentiality, Article 9 of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation 
states: ‘Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, all information relating to the 
conciliation proceedings shall be kept confidential, except where disclosure is 
required under the law or for the purpose of implementation or enforcement of 
a settlement agreement’.18 
It can be rationalised that the purpose in maintaining confidentiality in 
mediation is: (1) to promote trust and a guileless proceeding (sometimes 
underlying interests can be extremely personal and the parties may be hesitant to 
disclose them); (2) to deter the detrimental effect on the mediator's approach of 
14 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No.4) [2004] UKHL 48; [2005] 1 AC 610 [28]. 
15 Article 12.1-12.2, Practice Guideline 4, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, 'Mediation 
Rules' <https://www.ciarb.org/docs/default-source/practice-guidelines-protocols-and-
rules/4-guidelines-on-mediation-rules.pdf?sfvrsn=2> accessed 9 March 2016. 
16 ibid Article 14.1. 
17 Paragraph 9, Practice Guideline 1, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, 'Mediation Rules' 
<https://www.ciarb.org/docs/default-source/practice-guidelines-protocols-and-rules/1-
guidelines-on-confidentiality-in-mediation.pdf?sfvrsn=2> accessed 9 March 2016. 
18 UNCITRAL, 'UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with 
Guide to Enactment and Use' (2002) 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2002Model_conciliatio
n.html> accessed 23 April 2054; see also, Article 8 and Article 10 of UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Conciliation (2002).
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a neutral facilitator (compelling a mediator to testify or give evidence will 
compromise his/her neutral role); (3) to avoid publicity (disputants may avoid 
publicity to preserve business secrets, sensitivity of the dispute, etc.); and (4) 
avoid disputants limiting their disclosures, admissions and evidence if it might 
be used against them in subsequent litigation.19 Lide suggests that if mediation 
confidentiality is maintained, it is the most befitting ADR method to resolve 
commercial disputes, intellectual property and information technology matters.20 
However, Bondy argues that the accountability of public bodies is compromised 
and the scrutiny of outcomes is limited due to confidentiality of mediated 
settlements.21 What confidentiality actually means is often a ‘grey area’.22 
Symptomatically, in the UK, regardless of whether there is a confidentiality 
mediation clause, what transpires during mediation can be later admitted as 
evidence in litigation.23 Thus, despite the contractual duty of non-disclosure, 
admissions are not privileged simply because they are made in confidence.24 
Australian Courts have not comprehensively considered the confidentiality 
clauses, but policy facilitates their enforcement.25  
Meyerson submits that confidentiality in mediation is ensured by virtue of 
an agreement that can be enforced through common law, equity, or legislation.26 
It is a frequent practice for disputants to sign a mediation agreement with the 
mediator (e.g. confidentiality provisions is normally found in Australian 
mediation agreements).27 Confidentiality in mediation is usually contractual and 
the confidential obligations may be a term of a ‘quasi contract, an express term 
of a written agreement, or an implied duty’.28  Phipps and Toulson suggest that 
19 Nick v Morgan's Foods Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 2001 U.S. App. 23895. 
20 EC Lide, 'The Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Online Commerce, 
Intellectual Property and Defamation' [1996] 12 Ohio State Journal on Dispute 
Resolution 193. 
21 V Bondy, 'Mediation and Judicial Review- Mind the Research Gap' (2005) Judicial 
Review 220. 
22 A Poole, 'Mediation Case Law: Current Issues' (2008) Scots Law Times (News) 155. 
23 ibid. 
24 Santa Fe International Corp v Napier Shipping [1985] SLT 430, para 13.57 Evidence. 
25 Abriel v Australian Guarantee Corp [2000] FCA 1198; see also, 789Ten v Westpac Banking 
Corp (2004) NSWSC 594; and L Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (3rd edn, 
Butterworths UK 2005) 690. 
26 Meyerson (n 2) 6. 
27 ibid. 
28 Farm Assist Ltd (In Liquidation) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(No.2) [2009] EWHC 1102 (TCC); see also, AA Nolan and M O’Brien, 'Confidentiality In 
Mediations- A Work In Progress' (4 May 2010) delivered to the Victorian Bar CPD 
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the disputant-mediator relationship gives rise to the confidentiality duties.29 Law 
of equity may protect any confidentiality,30 and it is irrelevant whether the duty 
is a contractually implied term or an equitable duty. Many jurisdictions have 
adopted legislative provisions to address mediation confidentiality.31 The major 
legislative protection of confidentiality in mediation is given effect through 
admissibility of evidence provisions.  
II. THE “WITHOUT PREJUDICE” RULE
With respect to the probable existence of and desirability for a distinct privilege 
attaching to mediation, Brown and Marriott submit that ‘it remains to be settled 
conclusively by the courts, if not by the legislation, as to if there is a mediation 
privilege, including all transpiring communications, whether the mediation 
concerns civil, commercial, family matters, etc.’32 Phipps and Toulson notes that 
confidentiality is not a barricade to disclosure of information or evidence in 
litigation, but the court will only force such disclosure if it is essential for the fair 
disposal of the case.33 Nonetheless, the “without prejudice” rule is an exception 
to the above principle. The “without prejudice” rule’s purpose is to exclude all 
negotiations (oral or written) that are aimed at settlement from being produced 
as evidence in court (per Lord Griffiths).34 In the UK and Australia written and 
oral statements made on a “without prejudice” basis whilst mediating towards a 
settlement of a dispute are inadmissible in a following litigation pertaining to the 
same issue.35  
The “without prejudice” rule is based on a dual rationale as identified by 
Program <www.barristers.com.au/secure/downloadfile.asp?fileid=1002479> accessed 
13 May 2015. 
29 C Phipps and R Toulson, Confidentiality (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) para17-001, 
293. 
30 Corrs Paveys v Customs (Vic) (1987) FCR 442 per Gummow J at 442-443; see also, 
Australian Football League Ltd v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419; and Control 
Australia v Emtech & Associates (1980) FLR 184. 
31 See Section 24A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 of the State of Victoria (Australia). 
32 H Brown and A Marriott, ADR Principles and Practice (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell: 
London 1999) para 22-079. 
33 Phipps and Toulson (n 29) para 17-001; see also, British Steel Corporation v Granada 
Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096. 
34 Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280 HL at 1300. 
35 Boulle (n 25) 690. 
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Oliver LJ in Cutts v Head36: public policy of encouraging disputants to negotiate 
and settle out of court;37 and on the basis of an implied or express agreement 
between the disputants that their communications made in the course of 
settlement negotiations should be inadmissible in evidence if litigation arises.38 
This allows the disputants to agree impliedly or expressly to adjust the effect of 
“without prejudice” privilege, either by limiting or expanding its reach (per 
Robert Walker LJ).39 If there is anything that the parties want to disclose or 
make public, then it is necessary they include that in the settlement agreement 
itself. Because while the process is protected, the settlement that arises from it is 
not. A disclosure to mediator privilege information is not seen as waiving a right 
to privilege. Also, in an Australian judgement, Young J in Lukies v Ripley [No. 
2]40 held ‘mediation is somewhat analogous to “without prejudice”
discussions… [e]xpress or implied admissions made in the course of mediation
cannot be disclosed.’41
Zuckerman submits that policy considerations encourage settlement 
negotiations and once the disputants have consented to mediate on a “without 
prejudice” basis, ‘elementary justice expects the law to sustain the agreement 
that their communications should be privileged and inadmissible.’42 Boulle 
classifies five main exceptions to the non-admissibility principles: (1) parties 
consenting to disclosure; (2) admissibility of mediated agreements; (3) 
allegations of illegality (4) mediators reporting obligations; and (5) procedural 
hearings and costs orders.43 Additionally, exceptions suggested by Robert 
Walker LJ44 have been classed in three categories: (1) to support agreements 
between the parties;45 (2) permitting judicial control over the fairness of 
36 Cutts v Head [1984] Ch. 290 CA 306. 
37 Rush (n 34) 1300. 
38 Muller v Linsley & Mortimer [1996] 1 PNLR 74 CA; see also, Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v 
Prudential Insurance Co of America (No.2) [2003] EWCA Civ 1154. 
39 Unilever plc v The Procter & Gamble Co [2001] 1 All ER 783; Reed Executive v Reed Business 
Formation Ltd [2004] EWCA (Civ) 887. 
40 Lukies v Ripley [No. 2] (1994) 35 NSWLR 283. 
41 Daniels v AWA Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC 614 (CA). 
42 A Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice (2nd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell: London 2006) para 16.5. 
43 Boulle (n 25) 563; see also, Tracy v Bifield (SCWA) BC9801948; Halsey v Milton Keynes 
General NHS Trust: Steel, Joy & Halliday [2004] EWCA Civ 576; Reed (n 39);  Rajski v 
Tectran Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 476. 
44 Unilever (n 39). 
45 Brown v Rice [2007] EWHC 625 (Ch); [2008] FSR 3; see also, Reed (n 39). 
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settlement agreements; 46 and (3) distinct privilege analogous to the “without 
prejudice” rule.47 
In Earl of Malmesbury v Strutt & Parker,48 following a mutually decided 
waiver of privilege by the disputants, the court examined the “without 
prejudice” evidence and held that a party behaving unreasonably in mediation 
would be equivalent to a party evading to mediate, thereby risking a cost 
sanction. Although, it is doubtful that courts will hear evidence as to a party 
behaving unreasonably, as it will be privileged (except if the privilege has been 
waived).49 Cornes submits that the courts are normally supportive of the 
privilege in mediation, but the actuality is that attitude is essentially that of 
looking at “without prejudice” with reference to the common law rules created 
concerning “without prejudice” negotiations simpliciter.50  
In relation to witnesses, experts and other interested third parties who may 
be part of the mediation but not party to the mediating agreement or indeed its 
requisite confidentiality, it may be necessary for the mediator to ensure that the 
commitment to confidentiality is ensured by asking them to sign the 
confidentiality undertaking prior to participating in the process.  
Furthermore, Koo submits that legal professional privilege is a prominent 
safeguard against obligatory disclosures,51 and offers a complete protection level 
(per Lord Bingham CJ) unless the disputants waive their privilege (impliedly or 
expressly).52 Legal professional privilege is resolutely recognised in English law 
as a fundamental human right,53 and it covers document and other 
communications that arise from legal proceedings or giving or getting advice, so 
that the parties and mediators can communicate openly and confidently without 
the fear of enforced disclosure confidential communications. For a document to 
qualify for the privilege, the dominant purpose of the communication must have 
46 Ruttle Plant Hire Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2007] 
EWHC 2870 (TCC); [2008] 2 All ER (Comm) 264; see also, Farm Assist (n 28); Savings & 
Investment Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) v Fincken [2004] 1 All ER 1125; and Venture Investment 
Placement Ltd v Hall [2005] EWHC 1227 (Ch). 
47 Rush (n 34) 1300; and Muller (n 38). 
48 Earl of Malmesbury v Strutt & Parker [2008] EWHC 424 QB. 
49 Cornes (n 8) 402. 
50 ibid. 
51 Koo (n 4) 200. 
52 Paragon (n 12) 1188. 
53 The Law Society, 'England and Wales: The Jurisdiction of Choice' 
<http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/documents/downloads/jurisdiction_of_choice_brochur
e.pdf> accessed 2 May 2015.
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been to acquire legal advice. But then again, it is for the court to decide whether 
the main purpose of the communication was legal advice.54 It is submitted that 
there are exceptions to all privileges, and if any illegality is involved then the 
mediator can disclose the information.55 Also, the statutory exclusion to the 
“without prejudice” privilege can be some apparent public interest; while the 
privilege is normally absolute, it can be overridden by statute or waived by the 
disputants: ‘no balancing exercise… has to executed’ (per Lord Scott).56 
On the other hand, the question of enforcement of a settlement agreement 
by the court is factual and requires examination of the negotiation process. 
Contract law is interpreted based on the parties' intentions, and the courts 
deduce an explicit contract without looking to external contractual evidence:57 
The courts and the policy-makers have struggled with the tension between 
the need to develop the facts as to what transpired at the mediation in 
order to be in a position to analyse claims made under contract law, and 
the need to preserve the confidentiality of the mediation proceedings. 
Concern centres on both an identification of the circumstances and the 
nature of the evidence that should be allowed as to the mediation 
proceedings, and on the permissible scope of testimony by the mediator.58 
The permissible scope of testimony by the mediator in preserving 
mediation confidentiality has been a grave concern. Ideally, a mediator has a 
duty to protect confidential information and may not be duty-bound to testify in 
court. Notwithstanding, the position in relation to mediators is inconsistent. 
Mediators are often compelled to testify in courts. Even if a rule required that a 
mediator not give evidence in the court, the rule will plausibly fall away. Firstly, 
the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators59 does not generally prevent 
54 Greenough v Gaskell All ER 767 para 1824-1834. 
55 Paragon (n 12) 1188; R v Cox and Railton [1884] 14 QBD 153. 
56 Three Rivers (n 14) para 25. 
57 E Sussman, 'A brief survey of US case law on enforcing mediation settlement 
agreements over objections to the existence or validity of such agreements and 
implications for mediation confidentiality and mediator testimony' (2006) Mediation 
Committee Newsletter 32, 32. 
58 ibid 35. 
59 Standard V of the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, American Bar 
Association, American Arbitration Association and Association for Conflict Resolution, 
'Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators' (2005) 
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mediators from testifying under legal compulsion, and secondly, a requirement 
or a subpoena by a judge will trump any rule of any organisation and any 
voluntary codes of conduct which mediators might sign.  
III. COMPARATIVE APPROACHES: US, UK AND AUSTRALIA
Worldwide there is great divergence in the standard of confidentiality to which 
mediators are held. For example, in Australian courts, mediators have been 
subpoenaed to testify in courts. In Sweden, Belgium and Italy, lawyers who 
acted as mediators can invoke confidentiality provisions.60 In Germany, an 
agreement between the parties not to call the mediators as witness will be 
upheld in the civil courts and also in arbitration.61 This section will compare the 
approaches towards confidential mediation privilege in the US and the UK, with 
some consideration as to the Australian context. 
In the United States, many decisions based on government laws and 
statutes tend to reflect the evolving approach of the judiciary in introducing the 
“no exceptions” practice on the issue of confidentiality in mediation.62 More 
than a decade ago, in Rinaker,63 the courts had to consider whether the 
significance of the mediator's testimony would compensate the interests and 
principles that would be damaged if the mediators were duty-bound to testify. 
The court reasoned that the open court testimony was correct as ‘mediating 
parties had waived the protection of confidentiality and certainly have requested 
the court to compel the mediator to testify… If one mediating party were 
objecting to mediator's testimony, we would be faced with a considerably more 
complex analysis’.64 In this case, the California Court of Appeal said that 
mediation confidentiality was subordinate to the constitutional right. They 
waived the right to confidentiality with respect to public policy. 
<http://www.mediate.com/pdf/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal05.pdf> 
accessed 23 April 2015. 
60 Boulle (n 25) 690. 
61 ibid. 
62 M Zamboni, 'Confidentiality in Mediation' (2003) 6 (5) International Arbitration Law 
Review 175. 
63 Rinaker v Superior Court 62 Cal.App.4th 155, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 464 (3d Dist. 1998). 
64 ibid; PR Fisher, 'Changes In Mediation Confidentially' (2001) <http://www.fisher 
mediation.com/library_changes.php> accessed 5 April 2015. 
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In Olam v Congress Mortgage Co,65 the district court relied on its judicial 
powers to articulate its need to determine whether a statutory mediation 
privilege should yield to an obligatory need for evidence.66 The court 
contemplated that Section 1119 of California Evidence Code was not absolute, 
indicating to Rinaker's observation of the need for protecting confidentiality to 
give way to important public-policy issues.67 Statutory confidentiality was found 
to be subject to a judicial balancing of the contesting public policy discussion for 
confidentiality and the court’s necessity to ascertain facts to rule on the 
dispute.68 It was noted that refusing to admit the mediator's testimony could 
deprive the litigation of evidence required to analyse the claimant's competency 
contentions.69 In this case mediation privilege was subordinate to the 
administration of justice, thus there was no difficulty in waiving mediation 
confidentiality as public policy trumped. 
Hollenbeck submits that the court applied ‘a tortured interpretation’ of 
Section 703.5 California Evidence Code to hold that it could override a 
mediator‘s legislatively defined inabilities as a witness.70 Section 703.5 California 
Evidence Code provides that: ‘No mediator shall be competent to testify in any 
subsequent civil proceeding as to any statement, conduct [or] decision occurring 
at or in conjunction with the proceeding [over which the mediator presided]’. 
The courts construed that the section obligated an independent duty on the 
courts to establish whether a mediator's testimony may be rationalised by 
defending or advancing a conflicting interest of comparable magnitude.71 In 
Olam it was held that ‘in assessing the interests that would be damaged if the 
mediator were forced to testify or give evidence against the interests that would 
be threatened if the testimony/evidence were not accessible, the mediator was 
compelled to testify under the seal by the federal court, analysed the sealed 
testimony and allowed its disclosure by determining that it was justified by an 
65 Olam v Congress Mortgage Co. 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see also, Smith v 
Smith 154 FRD 661, 664 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Allen v Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 947 (S.D. 
Tex. 1998). 
66 Weston (n 5) 57. 
67 C Franklin, ' Mediation’s Confidentiality Controversy' 
<http://www.dailyjournal.com/cle.cfm?show=CLEDisplayArticle&qVersionID=80&ei
d=872569&evid=1> accessed 6 May 2015. 
68 Weston (n 5) 54. 
69 Franklin (n 67). 
70 K Hollenbeck, 'The Sounds of Silence: Compelling Mediator Testimony in Olam v. 
Congress Mortgage Co.' (2002) 20 (1) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 19. 
71 Olam (n 65). 
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prevailing fairness interest.’72 However, Hollenbeck argues that this ‘conclusion 
was incorrect since courts frequently decide the claim of a likewise situated 
disputant negotiating a contract without the help of a mediator’.73 Disputants 
who desire to enforce the settlement without the help of the mediator’s 
testimony are no worse off than if they settled by themselves. Furthermore, 
Uniform Mediation Act and the Ninth Circuit precedent signify that the 
required accessibility of evidence/communication does not overrule the 
confidentiality policy considerations, thus the court should not have compelled 
the mediator to testify.74 
On the contrary, in Foxgate,75 the courts held that there were “no 
exceptions” to mediation confidentiality (under Section 1119 and 1121 
California Evidence Code) where the disputants had urged a public-policy 
exception.76 It was construed that mediation must promote the administration 
of justice, with concern for maintain the virtue of the trials of those disputes 
which do not settle, and with further concern for the rights of concerned third 
parties in following litigation.77 The courts upheld the mediation privilege and 
provided that California statutes unreservedly prohibit admission and 
consideration of mediation communication in court78 and neither a party nor a 
mediator disclose mediation communications.79 The appellate court held that 
the mediator's report could be considered in this case.80 The Supreme Court had 
a different view and said that the confidentiality had to be respected.81 
Also, in Princeton Insurance Co,82 the court refused to admit mediator's 
testimony in evidence and asserted that it is questionable to posit a more 
poisonous ways to lessen the confidentiality promise that public policy considers 
as critical to the efficacy of mediation as enabling the use of a mediator as an 
72 ibid 1132. 
73 Hollenbeck (n 70) 19. 
74 ibid. 
75 Foxgate Homeowners Association v Bramalea California (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 1. 
76 KT Mcivers, 'Behind Closed Doors: The Supreme Court Protects Mediation 
Confidentiality in Foxgate' (2001) <http://www.mciversandslater.com/behind_ 
closed_doors_article.htm> accessed 6 May 2015. 
77 MD Marcus, 'Mediation Ethics' <http://marcusmediation.com> accessed 17 April 
2015. 
78 California Evidence Code, s 1121. 
79 Hollenbeck (n 70) 15. 
80 Foxgate Homeowners Association v Bramalea California (2001) 78 Cal. App. 4th 653. 
81 Foxgate Homeowners Association v Bramalea California (2001) 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642. 
82 Princeton Insurance Co v Vergano 883 A 2d 44 (Del Ch 2005) at 66. 
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opinion witness against the disputing party.83 Notwithstanding, United States 
now has a definite stand on the inadmissibility of mediator's testimony in 
litigation. Yet, as Franklin argues, there is still the risk that public-policy issues 
may override the confidentiality provisions in mediation under certain 
circumstances.84 
In the United Kingdom, normally the courts will not compel mediators to 
testify in litigation. However, this position was challenged in Farm Assist Ltd (In 
Liquidation) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (No 2),85 
where the court held that the “without prejudice” rule would not prevent the 
mediator giving evidence, as the privilege is only shared among the parties, and 
if they waived it, the privilege is overruled.86 The court reasoned that although a 
mediator can rightfully rely on the mediation agreement's confidentiality 
provision, in exceptional circumstances the court could override such rights in 
the interests of justice and to take all rational steps to generate evidence.87 
Owing to this, Koo submits that the contractual confidentiality protection is 
generally not broader than the “without prejudice” rule.88 Notwithstanding, it 
may be the ‘groundwork for the court to regulate against production of 
evidence/communication in mediation, where exclusions to the “without 
prejudice” principle do not apply or to award an interim injunction restricting a 
threatened breach of that confidentiality’.89 
In another line of reasoning, the court noted that compelling the mediator 
to give evidence or testify would not be contradictory to the mediation 
agreement, as the agreement was signed to provide mediation confidentiality 
concerning the underlying ‘dispute’, and regarded that the ‘dispute’ in question 
(economic duress claim) that the court was dealing with, was a separate 
dispute.90 Perhaps in the future, learning the lessons from these cases, mediation 
agreements could be more explicit in stating that ‘confidentiality of witness 
provisions and evidence extends to the existing and any other connected 
83 See also, Lehr v Afflito 889 A 2d 462, 474-5 (NJ Super .D 2006). 
84 Franklin (n 67). 
85 Farm Assist (n 28). 
86 J Tumbridge, 'Can an Arbitration Clause Survive Encroachment from European law?' 
(2010) 21 (4) International Company and Commercial Law Review 146. 
87 ibid. 
88 Koo (n 4) 200. 
89 Cumbria Waste Management Ltd v Baines Wilson (A Firm) [2008] BLR 330 para 17. 
90 Tumbridge (n 86) 146. 
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dispute’.91 Although the expectation of such a wording to provide absolute 
protection will still be futile, a widely drafted clause will carry more legal 
weight.92 
Furthermore, a mediator is obliged to make an authorised disclosure to the 
authorities such as the police, if the mediator gains information related to 
financial crimes, whilst mediating, or else the mediator will be guilty of an 
offence pursuant to Section 328 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. In relation 
to this, Burnley argues that the scope of mediation would be restricted, as 
certain disputes like fraud and tax evasion could not be mediated without the 
risk of the mediator committing an offence.93 Burnley submits that the test for 
overruling confidentiality in mediation within the UK is founded in equity,94 but 
the fairness of allowing a disputant to rely on communication or evidence is 
questionable.95 
Arguably, there is a lack of protection of mediation confidentiality between 
the parties and the mediator. Savory submits that the Farm Assist case96 has lifted 
the mediation confidentiality protection in the UK to a considerable extent, and 
presently the underlying question is whether there is a need to protect 
confidentiality by a statutory blanket.97 Justice Briggs, a UK High Court judge, 
concurs with the necessity of a mediation confidentiality privilege, especially in 
relation to commercial mediation.98 Tumbridge submits that the issue is still 
ongoing, pertaining to a mediator relying on “mediation privilege” and plausibly 
declining to testify or give evidence even if ordered to do so by the courts.99 
Although, it is submitted that the possibility of this happening is highly unlikely 
as the court's ruling or order would trump over any other. 
91 The Wellbeing @ Work Foundation, 'Mediators, Confidentiality and Court Witness 
Orders' 
<http://www.thewellbeingatworkfoundation.org/news-articles/mediators-
confidentiality-and-court-witness-orders> accessed 26 April 2015. 
92 ibid. 
93 R Burnley and G Lascelles, 'Mediator Confidentiality: Conduct and Communications' 
<http://www.cedr.com/library/articles/Mediator_confidentiality_SJBerwin.pdf> 
accessed 23 April 2015. 
94 ibid. 
95 Smiths Group & Anor v Weiss & Ors [2002] LTL 22/3/2002 at 20. 
96 Farm Assist (n 28). 
97 J Savory, 'Confidentiality under threat?' (2010) <http://www.rapproche.co.uk/ 
2010/02/confidentiality-under-threat/> accessed 23 April 2015. 
98 J Briggs, 'Mediation privilege? Procedure & Practice' (2009) 159 (7363) The New Law 
Journal 550. 
99 Tumbridge (n 86) 146. 
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In the interest of promoting mediation confidentiality, the policy makers in 
the European Union legislated the EU Mediation Directive,100. Article 7 of the 
EU Mediation Directive provides that ‘a mediator cannot be compelled to 
provide evidence about what transpired during mediation in following litigation 
between the parties, with certain exceptions (where the parties mutually agree, 
where overriding questions of public policy arise and where disclosure of a 
settlement for the purposes of enforcement).’101 
However, Justice Briggs submits that this provision adds nothing at all 
about the situations in which the mediating disputants other than the mediator 
may be obligated to produce evidence or communication about what transpired 
during mediation.102 Therefore, the courts will further struggle in striking a 
balance, because pursuant to this directive it is ambiguous as to what might be 
considered as evidence. Also, Cornes questions that if the disputants agree, will 
the mediator be obliged to testify or give evidence about what transpired in a 
personal session with either of the disputant?103 The questions remains as to 
whether Article 7 takes precedence of the initial contractual agreement and how 
will it be perceived against the standard provision in mediation agreements of 
making the disputants unable to obligate the mediator to testify or give 
evidence.104 Furthermore, the Article 7 exception of “overriding considerations 
of public policy” is ambiguous and does not provide for the extent of limitations 
of public policy. Cornes further questions whether “overriding questions of 
public policy” will include all exceptions to privilege as classed in Unilever105 
case.106 It should be noted that this is improbable because the exemptions in 
Cutts v Head107 are supposed to be founded on express or implied agreement 
(rather than overruling public policy). 
With respect to the above-cited cases, the inconsistent approach in relation 
to mediator testimony is evident, with many courts refusing mediator's 
testimony and many relying on it as a "tie-breaker"108 between the disputants 
100 Directive (EC) 2008/52 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial 
matters [2008] OJ L 136. 
101 Cornes (n 8) 404. 
102 Briggs (n 98) 550. 
103 Cornes (n 8) 404. 
104 ibid. 
105 Unilever (n 39). 
106 Cornes (n 8) 404. 
107 Cutts v Head [1984] Ch. 290 CA. 
108 Barnebei v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, WL 351754 (Ohio App 5 Dist 2005). 
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testimony.109 Sussman submits that although mediator’s testimony may be 
imperative, when it is balanced against the significance of confidentiality and 
weighed in light of the availability of evidence, the balance will frequently tip in 
confidentiality's favour.110 
IV. TOWARDS A BALANCED APPROACH
Poole submits that based on public policy there is a standard principle that 
mediation communications to settle may be privileged, which may indicate 
evidence of positions at mediation that may be inadmissible in evidence if they 
are met with objection (there are exceptions in relation to “without prejudice” 
communications).111 In the UK, there is an exception to the mediation 
confidentiality where the issue is whether a settled agreement has been achieved 
or not.112 It has also been suggested that documents produced for/by mediation 
are privileged, owing to public policy to promote mediation settlements.113 
‘Whatever the arrangement with respect to evidence's admissibility in court, a 
confidentiality commitment in mediation will have effect in private law. If 
mediation aspects are divulged, there may be a redress for contractual breach.’114 
Koo argues that the common law protection for confidentiality in 
mediation is more restrictive than normally perceived, and there is a non-
exhaustive list of recognised exceptions or varied interpretation of the 
disputants’ communication.115 Although the absence of an “empirical nexus” 
between a successful mediation and confidentiality, the ‘EU and US depended 
upon policy reasons to afford capable protection for confidentiality in mediation 
in the form of a statutory privilege’.116 
Cornes submits that in order to strike a balance, especially in the EU, it is 
advisable to have mediation privilege regulated by legislation (clear and 
109 Sussman (n 57) 32-39; see also, Standard Steel LLC v Buckeye Energy Inc, 2005 WL 
2403636 (WD Pa 2005). 
110 ibid. 
111 Poole (n 22) 155. 
112 Brown v Rice (n 45). 
113 Aird v Prime Meridian Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1866. 
114 Re a Company [2005] Ch D, Comm Leases 2006 Apr para 1102, unreported. 
115 Koo (n 4) 201. 
116 ibid; see also, SH Hughes, 'A Closer Look- The Case for a Mediation Confidentiality 
Privilege Has Not Been Made' (1998) 5 Dispute Resolution Magazine 14. 
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consistent in its approach), instead of leaving it to develop in common law.117 
The Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) in the US provides a considerable 
functional example and serves to formulate a communication privilege in 
mediation.118 It has adopted a ‘middle-path by promulgating a procedure that 
safeguards mediation confidentiality’.119 Communications to commence and 
engage in mediation120 are protected, as they are regarded critical for 
encouraging candour of disputants and public confidence, and for harmonising 
the private needs for confidentiality against the interests of justice.121 Privileged 
communications are protected from mandatory disclosure and are inadmissible 
as evidence122 in following litigation or other adjudicative processes.123 Although 
the settlement agreements could lose privilege if the requirement for the 
evidence significantly overrides the interest in safeguarding confidentiality 
(subsequent to a private hearing124 and the mediator may testify voluntarily).125 
Deason submits that UMA offers a balanced approach in accommodating 
conflicting policy issues in question and the issues of sustaining mediation 
confidentiality.126 Nonetheless, Cornes submits that UMA has mixed effects and 
for that reason it is criticised in certain States in the US and appreciated in 
some.127 It can serve as guidance, but not a draft that can be adopted in the UK; 
however UNCITRAL Model Law (in relation to cross-border commercial 
mediation) would provide a more ideal model of mediation legislation.128 
It is important to analyse why there is such a significant need to preserve 
the confidentiality of the mediation process, in order to understand the concerns 
on either side of the balancing act. Deason argues that confidentiality 
encourages communication between the parties and the mediator, thus making a 
117 Cornes (n 8) 404. 
118 A Britt, 'Are “Confidential” Mediation Proceedings Really Confidential? Will The 
Uniform Mediation Act Really Keep Mediation Communications Out Of Court In 
Subsequent Environmental Litigation?' (Juris Doctor Research Paper, Rutgers University: 
Rutgers School of Law 2003), 
119 Sussman (n 57) 36. 
120 Uniform Mediation Act, s 2(2). 
121 Prefatory Note and Comments to Section 4 Uniform Mediation Act. 
122 Uniform Mediation Act, s 4(a). 
123 ibid, s 2(7); Koo (n 4) 201. 
124 ibid, s 6(b)(2). 
125 ibid, s 6(c).; Burnley and Lascelles (n 93). 
126 EE Deason, 'Mediation Confidentiality' (2001) 85 (79) Marquette Law Review 110; see 
also, Peterson (n 10) 199. 
127 Cornes (n 8) 405. 
128 ibid. 
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settlement possible, which might be impossible in ordinary negotiation.129 It 
augments the prospects of settlement, based on the empirical supposition that 
owing to a confidential and protected negotiating sphere, the disputants will be 
more forthcoming in their communication and admissions.130 This is based on 
the notion that a legal system would protect the privacy of relations by yielding a 
privilege from testimony and discovery (eg attorney-client privilege encourages 
complete and candid communication among attorneys and their clients, thus 
fostering extensive public interests in the compliance of law and administration 
of justice).131 Folberg and Taylor submit that it is an accepted view that 
confidentiality on the disputants’ part is crucial to a successful mediation.132 The 
disputants will be cautious and defensive in their communications if there is an 
apprehension that their admissions may be later revealed to their possible 
disadvantage.133 Prejudice in commercial dealings, adverse publicity, free 
enterprise (disputants right to be evade public scrutiny), due diligence, trade 
secrets, proprietary information, liberty to brainstorm commercial opportunities, 
or even embarrassment in personal lives have all been causes of concern in the 
absence of assurance of confidentiality in mediation.134 
Confidentiality is also reasoned to be vital for maintaining the mediator's 
neutrality. If a mediator is compelled to testify or give evidence (regardless of 
how objective the testimony may possibly be),135 the mediator will be perceived 
as performing contrary to the disputants interests, thereby extinguishing his/her 
neutrality.136 Once a particular mediator has testified or given evidence, it is 
129 Deason (n 126) 110.  
130 Zuckerman (n 42) para.16.4; see also, H McIsaac, 'Confidentiality Revisited: California 
Style' (2001) 39 (4) Family Court Review 405-414; Beazer East Inc v Mead Corporation, 412 F 
3d 429 (3d Cir 2005); Thayer v Wells Fargo Bank NA, 2005 WL 1847174 (Cal App 1 Dist 
2005). 
131 Upjohn Co. v United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).; Deason (n 126) 80, 
132 J Folberg and A Taylor, Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflicts Without 
Litigation (1st edn, Jossey-Bass 1984) 264; LR Freedman and ML Prigoff, 'Confidentiality 
in Mediation: The Need for Protection' (1986) 2 Ohio State Journal on Dispute 
Resolution 37. 
133 OV Gray, 'Protecting the Confidentiality of Communications in Mediation' (1998) 36 
(4) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 674.
134 ibid; see also, Sussman (n 57) 32-39; Boulle (n 25) 690.
135 PJ Harter, 'Neither Cop Nor Collection Agent: Encouraging Administrative
Settlements by Ensuring Mediator Confidentiality' (1989) 41 Administrative Law Review
315, 325.
136 Deason (n 126) 82; see also, NLRB v Joseph Macaluso, Inc. 618 F.2d 51, 55-56 (9th Cir.
1980).
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likely that in future other parties will perceive the mediator to be unreliable and 
thus be deterred to use his/her services.137 Sussman contends that parties will be 
discouraged to mediate in the absence of trust in mediation, thereby damaging 
the procedure, since the settlement will not be concluded if the mediator cannot 
vanquish the disputants’ apprehension about confiding in each other (Foxgate).138 
It is therefore submitted that mediation confidentiality is essential to a successful 
and effective mediation, thereby motivating disputants to mediate. It further 
avoids the disputants from taking 'tactical advantage' of the evidence transpired 
during mediation by allowing it in subsequent proceedings.139 
It can be concurred that there are in fact genuine arguments for 
maintaining the sanctity of confidentiality in mediation, but there are also other 
"countervailing policies and principles" with which the above discussed reasons 
"find an uneasy equilibrium" in establishing the extent of the confidentiality 
principle (e.g. interest of concerning third parties, environmental interest, 
systemic discrimination in employment, personal injury, threat, juvenile issues 
etc).140 
With respect to policy in confidentiality, King et al. suggests that 
confidentiality is not an ‘unqualified attribute’, as often assumed.141 Law and 
policy require limitations to the privileged and confidentiality aspects of 
mediation and there are augmenting requirements to disclose communications. 
There are distinct fears about permitting disputants to draw ‘rigid cloaks of 
secrecy’ around their settlement and these have led to courts mitigate 
confidentiality.142 It is without question that mediation requires striking a 
balance of contradicting interests between the confidentiality privileges and 
administering sufficient disclosure. The courts have indeed struggled in fostering 
alternative dispute resolution and encouraging contractual non-disclosure on the 
one hand, and on the other, balancing it against public interest which requires 
that courts have access to evidence/mediator's testimony in the interest of 
justice. Birke submits that the expansion of institutional mediation 
137 Harter (n 135) 325. 
138 Foxgate (n 75).; Sussman (n 57) 32-39. 
139 Koo (n 4) 192. 
140 H Astor and C Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia (2nd edn LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Australia, 2002) 377-379. 
141 M King, A Freiberg, B Bagatol and R Hyams, Non-Adversarial Justice (2nd edn The 
Federation Press, 2010) 2. 
142 Boulle (n 25) 690. 
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confidentiality protection is not consistent.143 The US cases discussed previously 
(Olam144, Rinaker145 and Foxgate146) have held an evolving approach to 
confidentiality. Although, Rojas v Superior Court147 is the principal US (California) 
case that looks at the two different public policies, and attempts to strike a 
balance between supporting mediation and its requisite confidentiality, and not 
freezing litigation or upholding illegality. The legislation introduced in California 
goes further than the Uniform Mediation Act. The scope of the provisions in 
the California's Rule of Evidence could be difficult to distinguish. Evidence that 
would otherwise have been inadmissible would not be admitted or protected 
from disclosure solely by reason of introduction or use of this mediation 
process. Therefore, it is the balance between those two that determines what 
falls within the rule and is completely protected, and what falls outside it and 
therefore cannot claim to be protected solely for the purpose of avoiding court 
action. Rojas v Superior Court148 presented the crisis that subsists when two public 
policies clash (established policy which requires the disputants to disclose all 
relevant mediation communication/evidence and the newer policy of backing 
mediation confidentiality, so mediation can remain sacrosanct).149 The Supreme 
Court held that the policy of confidentiality in mediation communication was 
absolute and the only exception was evidence expressly specified by the statute. 
The strict interpretation of mediation confidentiality was also qualified in 
Simmons v Ghaderi,150 and more recently in Cassel v Superior Court,151 which 
expressly stated that attorney‐client communications in mediation was not 
subject to disclosure. 
Kichaven and Lascher submit that a disputant who asserts that evidence 
was prepared exclusively for mediation, and thus acquires protection against its 
use by the other disputant, should not be permitted to use that evidence in 
following trials. Also, that disputant should be obligated to recognise the 
143 R Birke, 'Standardising Mediation Confidentiality' (2003) 6 (3) ADR Bulletin 2. 
144 Olam (n 65). 
145 Rinaker (n 63). 
146 Foxgate (n 75). 
147 Rojas v Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 407. 
148 ibid. 
149 E van Ginkel, 'Rojas v. Superior Court: The Battle of Two Opposing Public Policies' 
(2005) <http://www.mediate.com/articles/vanGinkelE2.cfm> accessed 3 May 2015. 
150 Simmons v Ghaderi (2008) 44 Cal 4th 570. 
151 Cassel v Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 113. 
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evidence prepared exclusively for mediation when the evidence is disclosed.152 
Van Ginkel submits that a potential solution to this mediation confidentiality 
complexion is to amend the concerned legislation in a way that the mediation 
privilege only identifies evidence that has been labelled ‘prepared for mediation’ 
before their introduction in mediation, thus clearly authorising the court to 
measure the interests of the two competing public policies in  following 
litigation.153 
It is clear from the above discussion and arguments that confidentiality has 
at times been waived to protect public policy. Most prominently, Rojas and cases 
preceding it (Olam,154 Rinaker155 and Foxgate156) provide an example in which the 
courts are presented with the dilemma that arises when the policy requiring the 
party to disclose all relevant evidence, conflicts the policies supporting 
mediation confidentiality. In Foxgate,157 the original position was to waive 
confidentiality in favour of public policy, because it would not have affected the 
mediation process that much. However, on appeal the Supreme Court held that 
mediation confidentiality was sacrosanct and it should not be waived for the 
purposes by the appellate court. 
Questions still require answers pertaining to mediation confidentiality and 
will have to be addressed uniformly in all jurisdictions. Should the extent of 
protection in mediation confidentiality be contextual? What if mediation is 
rendered pointless by a party’s demeanour? Will it be too extreme to lift the 
confidentiality veil, when involving children, personal harm, greater good, etc? If 
yes, what will be the rational extent or limitation of mediation confidentiality? Is 
it practical to anticipate a full “code of silence” with respect to what transpires 
in mediation? If a settlement is agreed, should those settlements be qualified to 
the same enforcement, existence and reformation defences as in other 
contracts?158 
152 J Kichaven and WC Lascher, 'Amicus Curiae Brief of Southern California Mediation 
Association in Support of Petitioners' (2003) <http://www.jeffkichaven.com/ 
CM/Articles/SCMAsRojasBrief.pdf> accessed 3 May 2015. 
153 Van Ginkel (n 149). 
154 Olam (n 65). 
155 Rinaker (n 63). 
156 Foxgate (n 75). 
157 ibid. 
158 Burnley and Lascelles (n 93). 
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CONCLUSION 
This essay has only grazed the surface of the discussion involving striking a 
balance between encouraging settlement through the protected process of 
mediation and ensuring that litigants and the course had adequate access to 
evidence. In support of the view, the sanctity of the contract supports 
preserving confidentiality when there is an agreement.159 If confidentiality is too 
wide it will sterilise too much evidence, thereby undermining the trial process.160 
On the other hand, if it is too narrow, it will discouraging a party engaging in 
good faith from using mediation, which may have serious implications such as 
litigation costs, excessive abundance of disputes in courts, thereby slowing the 
administration of justice for all.  
The underlying issue is in drafting a confidentiality clause in a mediation 
agreement or settlement agreement, which will check whether confidentiality is 
too wide or too narrow. Although, the courts can invalidate a broadly drafted 
agreement and may suggest that more evidence should be admitted, Weston 
submits that absolute confidentiality for mediation (court-connected) is a 
rational solution, and the intentions of fundamental statutory confidentiality 
may be achieved by a qualified privilege of confidentiality (constitutional 
principles making those qualifications implicit).161 Absolute confidentiality might 
be too intense and may be contradictory to public interests (when the interest of 
third parties or interested parties may be adversely affected). As opposed to 
Weston’s view, Ginkel submits in concurrence with Pieter Sanders that absolute 
mediation confidentiality is not a satisfactory solution, despite the fact that it is 
now the widely accepted approach of the California Supreme Court.162 Ginkel 
further suggests that remedies must be found in an adequate mechanism that 
harmonises two contradicting public policies. However, it is still unclear how the 
balance could be achieved between the two conflicting public policies, between 
the need to protect the mediation process and encouraging settlement. Boulle 
argues that confidentiality has lost its appealing characteristic in today's society, 
which demands transparency and accountability in government and in the legal 
159 Boulle (n 25) 669. 
160 ibid. 
161 Weston (n 5) 30-78. 
162 Van Ginkel (n 149). 
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Justice and Confidentiality in the Mediation Process 
system.163 
Even though many academics, courts and policy makers have 
acknowledged that mediation confidentiality is ambiguous and evolving in many 
aspects, nothing consistent has been achieved.164 A uniform provision 
concerning the extent of mediation confidentiality and admissibility of evidence 
should be explicitly drafted in an accepted International Treaty. It should be 
used as authority and not just as mere guidance in member nations, who often 
inconsistently interpret provisions. It is now more imperative for the policy 
makers and courts to achieve the balance between the policy of encouraging 
confidentiality but not at the risk of stopping litigants or protecting illegal 
actions through confidentiality.  
163 Boulle (n 25) 669. 
164 Bondy (n 21). 
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